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The Connections We Make:  

























Moral disorientation is a temporally extended life experience that causes an agent to feel as if they 
can no longer rely on their own moral judgment. Examples of morally disorienting experiences 
might be a loss of a belief system, grieving the death of a loved one, or surviving a traumatic 
experience. In paradigm cases of moral disorientation, the feeling of having unreliable moral 
judgment is due to a loss of moral beliefs. How should the morally disoriented person who wants to 
be good reorient themselves? I will argue that morally disoriented agents should defer to friends 
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Chapter 1: Moral Disorientation  
1. What is Moral Disorientation?  
You will come to a place where the streets are not marked. 
Some windows are lighted, But mostly they’re darked.  
A place you could sprain both your elbow and chin! 
Do you dare to stay out? Do you dare to go in?  
How much can you lose? How much can you win? 
And IF you go in, should you turn left or right… 
or right-and-three quarters? Or, maybe, not quite? 
Or go around back and sneak in from behind?  
Simple it’s not, I’m afraid you will find, 
for a mind-maker-upper to make up his mind 
You can get so confused 
that you’ll start to race 
down long wiggled roads at a break-necking pace 
and grind on for miles across weirdish wild space...3  
 
 
 Most of us will come to a metaphorical place where “the streets are not marked,” if we have 
not already.4  For many people, disorientation is a somewhat familiar concept and an inevitable part 
of life. Disorientation is even portrayed in childhood stories, read by children who are just becoming 
oriented for the first time. Common descriptions of disorientation are: “being in a rough patch, being 
shaken up, having lost our way, needing guidance” or “taking things one step at a time.”5  
The definitive study of disorientation and its philosophical implications is Ami Harbin’s 
Disorientation and Moral Life.  Harbin describes disorientation as being “adrift in deep, unpredictable 
waters” where it seems that life can’t continue to go on, but it does, and you are carried along by 
 
3 Seuss. Oh, the Places You'll Go! HarperCollins, 2010.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Harbin, Ami. Disorientation and Moral Life. Oxford University Press, 2016. (p.20). (Emphasis in original).  
7 
these waves anyway.6 Harbin’s interest, as well as my own, lies in what happens to these agents in 
these “periods of being carried along.”7  
Grief is one experience which can lead to disorientation. In C.S Lewis’ book, A Grief 
Observed, Lewis gives an account of his disorienting experience of grief after his wife’s death: 
Feelings, and feelings, and feelings. Let me try thinking instead. From the rational point of 
view, what new factor has H’s death introduced into the problem of the universe? What 
grounds has it given me for doubting all that I believe? I knew already that these things, and 
worse, happened daily. I would have said that I had taken them into account. I had been 
warned– I had warned myself– not to reckon on worldly happiness. We were even promised 
sufferings. They were part of the programme. We were even told, ‘Blessed are they that 
mourn,’ and I accepted it. I’ve got nothing that I hadn’t bargained for. Of course it is 
different when the thing happens to oneself, not to others, and in reality, not in imagination. 
Yes; but should it, for a sane man, make quite such a difference as this? No. And it wouldn’t 
for a man whose faith had been real faith and whose concern for other people’s sorrows had 
been real concern. The case is too plain. If my house has collapsed at one blow, that is 
because it was a house of cards. The faith which ‘took these things into account’ was not 
faith but imagination. The taking them into account was not real sympathy. If I had really 
cared, as I thought I did, about the sorrows of the world, I should not have been so 
overwhelmed when my own sorrow came. It has been an imaginary faith playing with 
innocuous counters labelled “Illness,’ ‘Pain, ‘Death,’ and ‘Loneliness.’ I thought I trusted the 
rope until it mattered to me whether or not it would bear me. Now it matters, and I find I 
didn’t.8 
 
Lewis’ experience shows how the death of a loved one can leave a person completely disoriented 
with regard to their previously held values and beliefs. Elise Springer describes disorientation as 
“having the moral wind knocked out of you.”9 However, the indefinite article in the title of Lewis’ A 
Grief Observed reminds the reader that this is just one man’s response to his own unique experience of 
grief. It is completely possible that a person can experience grief without being disoriented. After all, 
people often have different responses to different life events. According to Harbin, “we need to feel 
disoriented in order to be disoriented.”10  
 
6 Harbin, Ami. Disorientation and Moral Life. Oxford University Press, 2016.(p.3). (emphasis in original). 
7 Ibid.  
8 Lewis, C.S. A Grief Observed. HarperCollins, 1994. (pp.36-37). 
9 Springer, Elise. “Disorientation and Moral Life.” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 29 Nov. 2018, 
ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/disorientation-and-moral-life. (emphasis in original). ̀  
10 Harbin, Ami. Disorientation and Moral Life. Oxford University Press, 2016. (p.14). 
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Since Harbin investigates disorientation under a wide range of contexts (queer sexualities, 
grief, education, trauma, illness, migration, and oppression), she explains that we should look at 
disorientation as a “family resemblance concept.”11 This conceptualization is due to the fact that 
different contexts of disorientation can have overlapping similarities despite the significant 
variation.12 The “threads of relation” that Harbin believes tie these experiences together is that they 
are “sustained, difficult experiences that make it hard to go on.”13 By “sustained” Harbin means that 
they are not fleeting moments of unease, and people do not quickly go back to feeling fine.14 
According to Harbin, disorientation can “change us without us knowing how we will be 
changed.”15 Disorientation can embitter us, paralyze us, and “unhinge us from positive moral 
orientations we have experienced in the past."16 This particular type of disorientation is what I will 
refer to as moral disorientation. Moral disorientation is an extended period of time where people feel 
that they are no longer able to rely on their own moral judgment. It is a loss of moral bearings. 
Examples of potential morally disorienting experiences are a loss of a belief system, grieving the 
death of a loved one, or surviving a traumatic experience.17 However, as I mentioned in the example 
of grief, some people will not respond to these events by feeling disoriented, so therefore they won’t 
be disoriented. No event in itself guarantees a resulting state of moral disorientation; it simply 
depends on one’s individual response to a particular context.  
However, most individuals face a difficult experience at some point in their life that 
challenges what they thought they knew, leaving them without any bearings in a “weirdish wild 
space.”18 For example, I was raised a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
 
11 Harbin, Ami. Disorientation and Moral Life. Oxford University Press, 2016. (p.17). 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. (p.18). 
15 Ibid. (p.174). 
16 Ibid. (p.xx). 
17 Ibid. (pp.13-22). 
18 Dr. Suess. Oh, the Places You’ll Go!. Random House, New York, 1990.  
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with a clear set of moral beliefs. I believed that God was very much involved in the details of my life 
and that I could be good simply from pleasing God. I believed that my divinely mandated role as a 
woman was to marry a righteous man and have righteous children. I believed in the abstinence of 
alcohol, pre-marital sex, coffee, and swearing. I believed that heteronormative families were central 
to God’s plan and in the importance of obedience to my “earthly parents,” as well as to my future 
husband. However, while studying at Brigham Young University, I was sexually assaulted, which 
created a type of “unlearning”19 where I no longer had these beliefs to fall back on. I could not make 
sense of how a divine being that I once thought helped me find my car keys, or assisted me on 
passing a military obstacle course, could not have intervened to protect me when I truly needed 
help. I also gained a greater awareness of the patriarchal structure of my religion, especially in the 
aftermath of my assault, and I could no longer accept my role within it. All of the things I once 
thought made me a good person -- my modesty, sexual “purity,” clean language, and abstinence 
from alcohol and coffee -- suddenly felt superficial. I was left with very little direction and a 
whirlwind of difficult questions in my moral life.  
My feelings of having unreliable judgment were constitutive of being morally disoriented; in 
paradigm cases of moral disorientation, the lack of confidence in one's moral compass is due to a 
loss of a necessary stock of moral beliefs.20 In Marjane Satrapi’s graphic novel, Persepolis, Satrapi 
describes an instance of moral disorientation when she loses her belief in God after her uncle is 
executed in Tehran during the Islamic Revolution. In Satrapi’s illustration, God is depicted as being 
an imaginary friend whom Satrapi had formerly turned to for safety and guidance.21 However, the 
violent death of her uncle created a disruption in her previously held beliefs: 
 
19 Harbin, Ami. Disorientation and Moral Life. Oxford University Press, 2016. (p.120). 
20 Ibid. (p.2). 








 Satrapi illustrates this experience as being one in which, similar to Lewis’s account of 
disorientation, the brutal facts of her own reality are no longer accommodated by the beliefs that she 
had.  Beliefs are supposed to correspond with reality, but there seems to be an inability to maintain 
former beliefs off of these types of experiences. It is a type of “unlearning.”23 Satrapi appears to 
reject her previously held moral beliefs, for example, the moral implications attached to her belief in 
God. However, we also see through her graphic representation just how difficult and overwhelming 
experiences of moral disorientation can be. Satrapi even questions what could be worse. It is no 
surprise, then, that those who have experienced moral disorientation might want to search for a way 




22 Satrapi, Marjane. Persepolis. L'Association, 2017. (pp.70-71). 
23 Brison, Susan J. Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self. Princeton University Press, 2002. (p.58).  
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2. Why the Morally Disoriented Should Try to Reorient Themselves 
The question at hand makes the assumption that escaping moral disorientation is both 
desirable and within the agent’s control. However, there are at least two possible objections to that 
assumption. 
One objection is that it is not in the agent’s control whether or not they can reorient 
themselves. Harbin’s account provides support for this objection by stating that reorientations “are 
not always possible” and “we may need to live with disorientations more often and for longer than 
we would like.”24 Harbin also claims that “part of what it means to respond to ourselves as 
disorientable is to relinquish a certain kind of control.”25 This letting go of control is what Harbin 
refers to as “grace.”26  
However, while it may not be in one’s complete control to reorient themselves (the same way 
finding one’s way out of a frightening forest may not completely be in one’s control), one is still 
more likely to reorient themselves if they try. This desire to continue trying is called hope. As for 
what hope we have in attempting to reorient ourselves, I will be arguing for a potential solution in 
chapter two. 
Another objection is that it may not be desirable for the morally disoriented to try to reorient 
themselves. Harbin’s account also gives some support for the second objection by arguing that, 
surprisingly, disorientation has “potential benefits.”27 These benefits include, increased awareness, 
positive shifts in one’s character,28as well as capacities to function without resoluteness.29 I will be 
 
24 Harbin, Ami. Disorientation and Moral Life. Oxford University Press, 2016. (p.173). 
25 Ibid. (p.172). 
26 Ibid. (p.172). 
27 Ibid. (p.xx). 
28 Ibid. (p.99). 
29 Ibid. (p.151). 
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categorizing these benefits as epistemic benefits, moral benefits, and practical benefits of 
disorientation.   
Harbin describes the epistemic benefits that can come from disorienting experiences as a greater 
awareness.30  However, she does not mean a type of “productive awareness” that makes it clear how 
to act as a result.31 Instead, Harbin maintains that the individual continues to remain disoriented, 
while developing an increased awareness of:  
1. How a person views herself and others as knowers.32 For example, in reflecting on one’s 
mistaken previous beliefs, one might become more aware of their own “epistemic 
fallibility.”33  
2. “Who one is” within the landscape of “oppressive norms and political complexity.”34 For 
example, students who are initially disoriented by critical education may come to “gain 
awareness of who they are within sexist, racist, and heterosexist social worlds.”35  
3. The powerlessness one may feel to create change as an individual.36 Harbin explains that this 
is beneficial insofar as it “can keep individuals from bold or hasty action” and it can help 
people realize that they need to work with others in order to effectively create change.37  
 Harbin discusses the potential moral benefits of disorientation as positive shifts in one’s moral 
character. Harbin calls these the “tenderizing effects” of disorientation because the habits and 
expectations that an agent has learned and solidified over time are made malleable.38 The 
“tenderizing effects” Harbin discusses are an increased capacity for:  
 
30 Harbin, Ami. Disorientation and Moral Life. Oxford University Press, 2016. (p.89). 
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid. (p.91). 
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid. (p.94). 
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid. (p.95). 
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid. (p.99). 
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1. “Sensitivity to vulnerability”: In the process of facing one’s own vulnerability, one can 
develop a greater sense of empathy or sympathy toward others who face the same or other 
difficult experiences.39 
2. "Living unprepared”: One is better able “to cope with one’s inability to control or guard 
against future unpredictability” and “to accept one’s insecurity.”40 
3. “In-this-togetherness”:  The ability to act in a way that reflects that one’s well-being is 
dependent on others, and others’ well-being is dependent on them.41  
4. And “living against the grain of norms”: “Embodying non-normative relationships, 
practices, and ways of being in ways that do not easily or immediately succumb to the force 
of social norms.”42 In other words, “disorientations can make it possible to live with 
oppressive norms as though they could be otherwise,”43 for example being gay and proud 
despite deviating from social norms. 
Harbin states that “when expectations are unsettled,” agents can change and become “more 
responsive” to the “non-ideal realities” of the world we live in.44 This is morally beneficial because, 
according to Harbin, “tenderized expectations more accurately reflect the actual conditions of 
oppressive society and prepare individuals to function well within conditions of unpredictability, 
vulnerability, and interdependence in their work going forward.”45 
Harbin also maintains that it is a mistake to take on the view that “people can either be good 
agents, or disoriented, but not both.”46 She provides support for this assertion with potential practical 
benefits of disorientation. Harbin argues that there are some contexts of injustice where irresolute 
 
39 Harbin, Ami. Disorientation and Moral Life. Oxford University Press, 2016. (p.103). 
40 Ibid. (p.108). 
41 Ibid. (p.112). 
42 Ibid. (p.116-117). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. (p. 120). 
45 Ibid. (p. 121). 
46 Ibid. (p.164). 
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actions can be useful.47 The main difference between resolute and irresolute actions is whether or 
not the agent performs them with “sureness of self.”48 In cases that call for irresolute actions, it may 
be useful to have an agent with “less sure-footed ways of being.”49 In other words, disorientations 
may “generate capacities for function without resoluteness.”50 Harbin describes these practical 
benefits that can come from disorientations as the increased ability to perform the following 
irresolute actions: 
1. “Both/and actions”: An agent can “tentatively pursue multiple goals that are in tension with 
one another.”51 There are some instances in which prioritizing one goal risks giving less 
attention to another worthy goal, and the irresolute action of pursuing both is helpful.52 For 
example, in the case of mass incarceration, one might pursue “both harm reduction in prisons 
and prison abolition.”53 
2. “Doubling back actions”: Rather than acting conclusively, in the case of persistent injustices, 
one can check and recheck with “a constant questioning” and cultivate “capacities to hear 
challenges from others.”54 
3. “Building without blueprints”: The ability to work on things without knowing exactly what 
the end state will be.55 These actions can be beneficial in cases where it is not yet clear how 
to create something that meets everyone’s needs or addresses multiple problems. Yet, 
despite the uncertainty, building something new is still necessary.56 For example, in ending 
 
47 Harbin, Ami. Disorientation and Moral Life. Oxford University Press, 2016 (p.150). 
48 Ibid. (p.149). (Emphasis in original). 
49 Ibid. (p.63). 
50 Ibid. (p.151). (Emphasis in original). 
51 Ibid. (p.137). 
52 Ibid. (p.134). 
53 Ibid. (p.135). 
54 Ibid. (pp.142-143). 
55 Ibid. (p.146).  
56 Ibid. (p.149).  
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police brutality, agents may need to build a completely new system that is unfamiliar to what 
they have formerly depended on.  
In short, Harbin suggests that disorientations can better situate individuals to approach problems 
with “constant questioning, tentativeness, and openness to correction.”57 These practical benefits, as 
well as the moral and epistemic benefits of disorientations may give us reason to question whether 
escaping disorientation is desirable. However, I will argue that finding the path out of disorientation 
is the more desirable option to the morally disoriented agent.  
 While I agree that these benefits are real, the benefits of disorientation do not outweigh the 
costs. Harbin concedes that “in many cases the agent who acts wholeheartedly will be better off than 
one who faces perpetual turmoil of will.”58 Harbin also makes it clear that she does not argue in 
favor of disorientation itself; she states that “disorientations are not so much good in themselves as 
they are a reality.”59 Harbin also implores her reader not to forget the potential negative effects of 
disorienting experiences:  
We cannot know in advance which disorientations have the potential to benefit moral agents, 
and which do not. Disorientations do not always enable moral agency, and it is important not 
to glorify or over-aestheticize such difficult experiences. They can and do interfere with 
wholehearted, decisive action. They can paralyze, overwhelm, embitter, and misdirect moral 
agents. They can unhinge us from positive moral orientations we have lived out in the past. 
The kinds of disorientation we have experienced in the past can affect our threshold for 
tolerating them (i.e., how much disorientation we can handle and experience as help rather 
than harm).60 
 
As Harbin remarks, there is only a certain threshold of disorientation that we can handle before it 
becomes harmful. Accordingly, the longer a person remains in a morally disoriented state, the more 
likely they are to experience harm. Moreover, ongoing moral disorientation poses a risk of 
wrongdoing. In saying this, I do not mean that a morally disoriented agent cannot be a good agent, 
 
57 Harbin, Ami. Disorientation and Moral Life. Oxford University Press, 2016 (p.149). 
58 Ibid. (p.63). 
59 Ibid. (p.xix) 
60 Ibid.  
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but it seems that an increased risk for acting wrongly when one’s sense of morality feels unreliable 






















Chapter 2: Moral Deference 
How, then, should morally disoriented individuals who want to be good try to reorient 
themselves? It seems that the morally disoriented person has two options: they can try to regain their 
moral orientation alone or by deferring to others on issues of morality. In this chapter I will be 
arguing that the morally disoriented cannot and should not go it alone.  
 
1. What is Moral Deference?  
In order to understand moral deference, we will first need to understand the more 
fundamental concept of moral testimony. Moral testimony is a proposition with “explicit moral 
content.” For example, “you are a good person” or “it is wrong to kick babies.” However, I will not 
be attempting to define moral and nonmoral matters, under the assumption that we can roughly 
distinguish them.61 Moral testimony can be both solicited and unsolicited. It can be something you 
hear in lecture from one of your philosophy professors, or something a close friend tells you in 
response to a personal question you ask. Moral testimony can also include moral advice. According 
to Paulina Sliwa, moral advice is simply “testimony about practical questions” or “questions about 
what we should do” which encompasses many moral questions that we face.62  
Agents can act in various ways in response to the moral testimony of another. One response, 
moral deference, is traditionally defined as forming a moral judgment “merely based on the view of 
 
61 Hills, A. (2009). Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology. Ethics, 120(1). (p. 94). 
62 Sliwa, Paulina. “In Defense of Moral Testimony.” Philosophical Studies, vol. 158, no. 2, 2012. (p. 184). 
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another,”63 or “purely by someone else’s moral judgment”64 or “just based on their say-so.”65 
However, to say that moral deference exclusively involves cases where the agent is acting solely on 
someone else’s moral testimony seems unrealistic. It seems rare that an agent would completely 
ignore all other available evidence. For example, if someone were to tell an agent that it is morally 
wrong to eat factory farmed meat, they might accept that based on someone’s say-so. However, that 
does not mean that they wouldn’t ask why, or that they wouldn’t still consider their own moral 
intuitions or think of all the information about factory farmed meat they already have from their 
own lived experience or exclude other potential sources of evidence.  
As Paulina Sliwa points out in her advocacy of moral deference, “reliable testimony is in 
general just one piece of evidence that I have.”66 Moral agents, even disoriented ones, have the 
ability to critically reflect on all the available evidence around them. While their critical reflection and 
deliberation may not always yield the right answer, the morally disoriented are still rational agents 
who bring their own thoughts and feelings to the table. In short, it does not seem plausible that any 
person could completely carve out all other sources of knowledge or their own moral intuitions, 
regardless of whether or not they feel their ability to interpret that evidence is reliable.  
Sliwa also argues that even in the rare instances in which a speaker’s testimony appears to be  
the only evidence one has about a moral question, rationality may still require the agent to think about 
the plausibility of what they have been told.67 For example, I once asked my usually reliable mentor 
what he believed in and he responded by sending me a link to 28-foot tall lizard god named “Zorp 
the Surveyor,”68 and I felt that I could safely assume that he was joking. 
 
63 Enoch, David. “A Defense of Moral Deference.” The Journal of Philosophy, May 2014, Vol. 111, No. 5. (p. 229). 
(emphasis added).  
64 Hills, A. “Moral Testimony.” Philosophy Compass. 2013. (p.552).  (emphasis added).  
65 McShane, Paddy J. “The non-remedial value of dependence on moral testimony.” Philos Stud, 2018. (p. 639). 
(emphasis added).  
66 Sliwa, Paulina. “In Defense of Moral Testimony.” Philosophical Studies, vol. 158, no. 2, 2012. (p. 183). 
67 Ibid. 
68 “Zorp the Surveyor.” Parks and Recreation Wiki, parksandrecreation.fandom.com/wiki/Zorp_the_Surveyor.  
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The traditional definition of deferring “purely” on the basis of someone else’s moral 
testimony would make any scenario of moral deference intuitively problematic because it feels 
wrong to unquestioningly or unthinkingly do what we are told.69 Especially, it seems, in the case of 
moral matters, since our moral judgments reflect our personal character.70 There is something 
unsettling about someone having absolutely no personal input in a moral judgment they adopt for 
themselves. It would seem robotic or radically subservient to accept moral testimony in a way that 
completely bypasses one’s own thoughts and feelings. While blind obedience may be an extreme 
form of moral deference, it is not the only form of deference.  
Instead, a less idealized definition of moral deference is needed to better reflect lived 
experiences. I will define moral deference as when an agent relies on another’s moral testimony as 
the strongest evidence for forming a moral judgment. This definition captures a wider range of 
experiences where critical reflection is involved to varying degrees in accepting moral testimony, but, 
rarely, if ever, completely eradicated.   
 
2. The Myth of Going It Alone 
Deference, however, is only one path the disoriented might take; they might also attempt to 
reorient themselves alone, obtaining new moral beliefs on their own. An individualist approach to 
belief formation like this is at least partly due to the influence of René Descartes. In the Meditations, 
Descartes cultivates his own somewhat disorienting experience when he uses the method of doubt 
in order to find what he believed to be a sure foundation for knowledge. Descartes describes his 
 
69 Sliwa, Paulina. “In Defense of Moral Testimony.” Philosophical Studies, vol. 158, no. 2, 2012. (p. 183). 
70 Jones, Karen. “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge.” The Journal of Philosophy. Feb., 1999, Vol. 96, No. 2. (p. 57).  
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experience almost identically to Harbin’s description of feeling “like one loses one’s footing and is 
adrift in deep, unpredictable waters,”71 when he writes:  
The meditation of yesterday filled my mind with so many doubts that it is no longer in my 
power to forget them. And yet I do not see in what manner I can resolve them; and just as if 
I had all of a sudden fallen into very deep water, I am so disconcerted that I can neither 
make certain of setting my feet on the bottom, nor can I swim and so support myself on the 
surface.72  
 
 In his process of escaping this generally disorienting experience, Descartes reorients himself 
by “going it alone” over the course of a few days of meditation. By going it alone, I mean using 
private reasoning and reflection exclusively. However, as Harbin points out, in the case of Descartes, 
this is a case of a transitory experience of disorientation rather than a temporally extended 
experience of disorientation.73 In fleeting moments of disorientation, it may be possible to 
reconstruct one’s beliefs with critical thinking alone, but it seems that extended periods of 
disorientations would be much more challenging and require a different method. I will argue that 
this is especially true in cases of moral disorientation. 
 While my definition of moral deference gives a role to the critical reflection demonstrated by 
Descartes, it certainly does not promote only using private reasoning and reflection. I will argue that 
going it alone through the exclusive use of critical reflection is not a feasible way of reorienting 
oneself in the case of moral disorientation. Just as rationality may require that an agent does not 
defer purely based on another’s moral testimony, it may also demand that an agent does not rely purely 
on their own personal deliberation.  
 For, example, in her book Aftermath, Susan Brison gives a devastating account of moral 
disorientation as a survivor of rape and attempted murder, where she utilizes both self-reliance and 
interdependence. Brison explains that “trauma shatters one’s most fundamental assumptions about 
 
71 Harbin, Ami. Disorientation and Moral Life. Oxford University Press, 2016 (p.3). 
72 Ariew, Roger, and Eric Watkins. Modern Philosophy: an Anthology of Primary Sources. Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 
2019. (p. 64).  
73 Harbin, Ami. Disorientation and Moral Life. Oxford University Press, 2016 (p.4). 
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the world,”74 which can make one feel as if they have landed “beyond the moral universe” and do 
not know how to get back.75 She then goes on to say that in attempting to rebuild her beliefs and 
reorient, she found herself “like Descartes, ‘quite alone,’ with ‘a clear stretch of time’ in which to 
rebuild [her] shattered system of beliefs.”76 Brison also recounts another sexual assault survivor’s 
experience of personal reflection, who explains that “when your life is shattered, you’re forced to 
pick up the pieces, and you have a chance to stop and examine them. You can say ‘I don’t want this 
one anymore’ or I think I’ll work on that one.’”77 However, while critical reflection is a necessary 
component to rebuilding one’s moral beliefs, Brison does not solely self-reflect but also relies on 
those around her. In fact, she clearly emphasizes the need for “empathetic listeners”78 to listen and 
respond in the process of rebuilding.  
 Brison states that “the trauma survivor must find empathetic listeners in order to carry on.”79 
However, it seems that as an empathetic listener one is called to do more than just listen; one is also 
called to respond. Brison seems to illustrate this point further through her own personal experience.  
But it’s essential to talk about it, again and again. It’s a way of remastering the trauma, 
although it can be retraumatizing when people refuse to listen. In my case, each time 
someone failed to respond I felt as though I were alone again in the ravine, dying, screaming. 
And still no one could hear me. Or, worse, they heard me, but refused to help.80  
 
Brison’s salient account gives us reason to think that morally disoriented agents need to be 
responded to in a way that necessitates some form of moral testimony -- even if that testimony is as 
simple as “what you experienced was truly awful” or “you are still a good person despite what 
you’ve gone through.” 
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Harbin also expresses the need for “sympathetic interpreters” who “listen and support.”81  
She explains that “without an interpreter of my expression of disorientations, I may be more likely 
to doubt, question, or dismiss my own experience.”82It seems that in being an interpreter, one is not 
just called upon to accept moral testimony, but to offer moral testimony as well in order to provide 
support.  
Another particular type of moral testimony that I take to be key in allowing morally 
disoriented agents to reorient themselves is testimony about who they are. While dependence on 
others for self-definition may seem self-contradictory, it is less so when we consider how 
“fundamentally relational” one’s character is.83 As Harbin states, “one’s identifications are not up to 
oneself alone” and one of the benefits of being disoriented is that you become more aware of this 
salient fact.84 Brison also supports this idea by presenting research which shows that survivors of 
trauma often depend on others’ attitudes or beliefs toward them in the aftermath of traumatic 
experiences:85  
Survivors of trauma recover to a greater or lesser extent depending on others’ responses to 
them after the trauma. These aspects of trauma and recovery reveal the deeply social nature 
of one’s sense of self and underscore the limits of the individual's capacity to control her 
own self-definition.86 
 
Especially important is testimony about one’s own character. In paradigm cases of moral 
disorientation, agents are insecure about their most foundational beliefs (including their beliefs about 
themselves) and likely feel an altered sense of self-worth. It seems that in order for an agent to be 
good, they would need some reason to think that there is some goodness in them already. Dylan 
Scholinski illustrates this point in his memoir, The Last Time I Wore A Dress, when in the aftermath of 
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abuse and neglect, he punched a kid at school and felt that he was no longer a good role model for 
his sister, Jean: 
The next day in the hall on the way to recess I punched Earl in the stomach and knocked 
him down. Nothing happened to me for punching him and I wouldn’t have cared if anything 
did. My mother was gone, and layers were piling on top of me, layers and layers. I knew I 
wasn’t being good and polite and a role model for Jean but my teachers and my father and 
my mother didn’t believe I ever could be anyway, so why should I try? I couldn’t see out 
from the layers on top of me and no one could see in.87  
 
Here, what robs Scholinski of the desire to be good is the lack of confidence others have in his 
goodness. It seems that the morally disoriented person, even if they were to act on their own moral 
judgments unaided, would at some point at least need to rely on the moral testimony of others that 
they have some goodness in them. My argument is as follows:  
P1. To try to be good requires knowing that you're already a little good. 
P2. The disoriented person cannot know on their own that they're good. 
C1. Therefore, the disoriented person cannot try to be good on their own. 
 Another example that makes the dependence on others painfully clear, is a scene from the 
television series Bojack Horseman. Here, the main character, Bojack, solicits moral testimony from his 
close friend Diane, during his experience of moral disorientation:  
...I guess my question is do you think it’s too late for me?... I mean am I just doomed to be 
the person that I am?... I mean it’s not too late for me, is it? It’s not too late? Diane, I need 
you to tell me it’s not too late...I need you to tell me that I'm a good person. I know that I 
can be selfish and narcissistic and self-destructive, but underneath all that, deep down, I'm a 
good person and I need you to tell me that I'm good, Diane... Tell me, please, Diane, tell me 
that I'm good…88 
 
Bojack appears to be worried that his life experience shows that wanting to be good is not enough 
to actually be good. Without having moral testimony that can spark enough hope for an agent to 
keep trying, it seems that reorientation is futile. So, it appears that moral deference is necessary, at 
the very least in giving the morally disoriented hope to continue on.  
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3. Suspicions of Moral Deference 
But despite its potential usefulness to the disoriented, moral deference seems to be 
controversial. Indeed, if one were to peruse the philosophical journals, it might seem like there's a 
debate about whether moral deference is acceptable. But in fact, the debate is really over when moral 
deference is morally acceptable. No one argues that moral deference is never acceptable. For 
example, most people would agree that moral deference is acceptable in the case of children forming 
their beliefs based on their parent’s moral testimony.89 People also generally agree that moral 
deference is acceptable in cases where there are significant epistemic or moral limitations. For 
instance, Allison Hills, although against moral deference in general, specifically argues for its 
acceptability in the case of any moral agent whose “starting points are too far off the mark”90 or 
“anyone who does not have the requisite stock of true moral beliefs.”91 This, of course, would 
include paradigm cases of moral disorientation.  
Nevertheless, resistance to moral deference is a longstanding part of the philosophical 
tradition. In “An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment,” Immanuel Kant famously 
critiques accepting guidance from others as “immaturity” and instead calls on agents to rely on their 
own reasoning.92 Kant argues that it is “laziness and cowardness” that tempts agents to “gladly 
remain immature for life.”93 He goes on: “It is so convenient to be immature! If I have a book to 
have understanding in place of me, a spiritual adviser to have conscience for me, a doctor to judge 
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my diet for me, and so on, I need not make any efforts at all.”94 Kant believes that moral deference 
entails a compromised autonomy that can stem from laziness and cowardice.  
If the morally disoriented are in special need of moral deference, then Kant’s suspicions 
mean that they will be especially susceptible to laziness and cowardice. This is reflected in the 
television series Fleabag, the name given to the main character, implying her to be a person of bad 
character. She feels that she is “a greedy, perverted, selfish, apathetic, cynical, depraved, morally 
bankrupt woman who can’t even call herself a feminist.”95 Throughout her morally disorienting 
experience of grief, she has sex with her best friend’s boyfriend, she steals, and she lies to the people 
closest to her. Her moral disorientation leads her to crave deference in a confession to a priest: 
I want someone to tell me what to wear in the morning. I want someone to tell me 
what to wear every morning. I want someone to tell me what to eat. What to like, what to 
hate, what to rage about, what to listen to, what band to like, what to buy tickets for, what to 
joke about, what not to joke about. I want someone to tell me what to believe in, who to 
vote for, who to love and how to tell them. 
I just think I want someone to tell me how to live my life, Father, because so far, I 
think I’ve been getting it wrong — and I know that’s why people want people like you in 
their lives, because you just tell them how to do it. You just tell them what to do and what 
they’ll get out at the end of it, and even though I don’t believe your bullshit, and I know that 
scientifically nothing I do makes any difference in the end anyway, I’m still scared. Why am I 
still scared? So just tell me what to do. Just fucking tell me what to do, Father.96 
 
Here, Fleabag attempts to defer in both moral and non-moral matters, even when it is clear that she 
would have come to another conclusion if she were left unaided. However, intuitively her behavior 
is morally and epistemically problematic. In particular, that she appears to have compromised her 
autonomy, which is exactly what Kant is concerned about.  
However, Sliwa argues that what is problematic about a case like this is not the moral 
deference, but the ulterior motives underlying it.97 In cases like this the agent is not relying on others 
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because she wants to do the right thing, but because she appears to lack self-worth.98 She is not 
relying on the priest to resolve moral uncertainty but is instead asking the priest to make the moral 
judgments for her. Other ulterior motives can be attributed to laziness or cowardice in attempting to 
avoid responsibility, but in this particular case, it seems that it is more due to the fact that she lacks 
self-worth.99 In other words, Sliwa states, unlike in cases of moral deference where one is earnestly 
seeking moral knowledge, agents like Fleabag are “using other people to make their decisions for 
them rather than relying on them for belief, so they can decide on their own.”100 She appears to be 
relying on moral deference as the only evidence, rather than the strongest evidence to make her moral 
judgments. Fleabag’s autonomy is thus compromised because she has basically “given up as an 
agent.”101  
 
4. A Defense of Moral Deference 
Despite issues of ulterior motives, moral deference is in fact compatible with autonomy. In 
her critique of Kant, Linda Zagzebski argues that the process of responsibly and conscientiously 
governing oneself with reason actually requires dependence on others.102 There are those “whom one 
is required by reason to trust,” which “includes the acceptance of epistemic and practical 
authority.”103 In other words, by using one’s own reason to choose who to trust, one is still acting 
autonomously, and is in fact in some cases acting more responsibly than when solely relying on 
oneself:  
If we rely solely upon our own individual reason in governing ourselves, we are less likely to 
become a conscientiously governed self than if we take some of our beliefs, attitudes, 
intentions and goals from others. This is because there are other people whose conscious 
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states are more likely to survive our own conscientious reflection than the states we acquire 
independently.104  
 
In other words, there will always be people in a better epistemic position to provide more moral 
knowledge than we could otherwise obtain from our own private reflection. Sliwa argues similarly 
that moral deference can be “epistemically good because it allows us to take advantage of our peers 
who may be epistemically better placed to make certain moral distinctions and to come to the right 
conclusion.”105 
 Zagzebski also argues that critical reflection and deliberation can still be very much involved 
in deferring to others in the process of choosing who to defer to, and thus autonomy is not 
compromised:  
The subject takes direction... from an exemplar or an admirable person because of 
something in herself that she reflectively endorses... It is a dictate of self-direction. Similarly, 
if the subject judges that another person is more likely to have true beliefs in the relevant 
domain than she has herself, and she has the desire for truth, she has a reason to believe 
what the other person believes. Her reflection on her own end leads her to adopt the 
strategy of taking certain beliefs from the other person… She is autonomous when she does 
so because she is acting on her own reasons for her own ends.106  
 
As we can see individual thinking and effort is still present in the process of moral deference 
especially in judging who to defer to.  
Both Sliwa and Zagzebski’s arguments are supported by the assumption that there are 
disparities in moral knowledge and agents differ in their reliability on a given moral question. And in 
the case of the morally disoriented agent, it seems even more plausible that they are morally 
permitted and perhaps even morally obligated to rely on others in order to be morally conscientious. 
It turns out that, contrary to Kant’s assertions, sometimes the most mature and autonomous 
decision one can make is to defer to other people.  
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However, with so much critical reflection involved in endorsing a reliable testifier, one might 
begin to doubt that the morally disoriented agent is truly deferring, since the decision of who to defer 
to arises from their own self-reflection. In other words, it could be argued that the fact that you've 
judged a person to be a reliable testifier means that whatever testimony they give you is merely a 
reflection of your values all along. As Jean-Paul Sartre says, “if you seek counsel--from a priest, for 
example--you have selected the priest; at bottom you already knew, more or less, what he would 
advise”107 In other words, Sartre's point is that one wouldn't choose to go to a priest unless the agent 
agreed with what they thought the priest would advise. So, this is not a true case of deference 
because the priest's beliefs ultimately reflect your values. 
I would agree with Sartre that sometimes agents which appear to be deferring are in fact not. 
It may be the case that an agent really does know, deep down, what a particular priest or testifier 
would advise for a given moral question. And in the case of Fleabag, ulterior motives aside, it seems 
that she could plausibly predict what a Catholic priest might have to say. However, she also seems so 
defeated that she no longer really cares what is advised so long as she can give up on making 
decisions for herself. In this case, she doesn’t seem to be looking for a particular answer; she just 
predicted that a priest would be one to give an answer. Thus, it seems that the same can be the case 
for those who are genuinely concerned for what is right or wrong. An agent can approach a testifier 
simply hoping to find an answer rather than the answer they hope to receive.  
 What about Kant’s accusations of the cowardice of those who defer? Contrary to his 
assertion, by relying on moral deference to do the right thing, the morally disoriented agent is still 
exercising courage. Trusting another person and choosing to rely on them can in fact require bravery, 
perhaps even more so than if one was to rely on one’s own judgment. For instance, accepting 
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someone else’s moral testimony can require courage if in doing so one is admitting their own 
epistemic or moral fallibility. For example, it might take courage to accept someone else’s moral 
testimony that they made a racist comment.  
 As for Kant’s criticism of laziness, Karen Jones states that the evidential standards for 
justified trusting of a testifier are high, and the “morally indolent can take no particular comfort” 
from a defense of moral deference.108 Indeed, as we shall see in the next chapter, judging someone 
to be a reliable testifier will take a lot of hard work. So, we see that choosing to rely on others is not 
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Chapter 3: Deferring to Friends  
 
1. Identifying Moral Exemplars 
Now that I have argued for moral deference, one might wonder how a morally disoriented 
agent might be able to identify a trustworthy testifier. In the literature regarding moral deference, the 
guides one should hope to identify are moral experts.109 A moral expert is a person who is 
“trustworthy, experienced, and knowledgeable” when it comes to what is morally right or wrong.110 
Some define a moral expert in a strong sense which would require them to be an expert in all moral 
matters. However, I will be focusing on moral experts in a weak sense, which would only require 
someone to be reliable in answering questions within a particular moral topic.111 In other words, the 
person to whom a morally disoriented agent defers does not need to be a moral expert in all matters, 
but just particular moral topics.   
Of course, the morally disoriented person may not be able to easily identify a moral expert, 
since the criteria to decide who has moral expertise might require moral starting points that the 
morally disoriented person does not have. In other words, it would be difficult for a morally 
disoriented person to make a judgment about who has the moral knowledge that they lack. 
However, there is a certain type of moral expert that is more easily identifiable for a morally 
disoriented agent: a moral exemplar. Moral exemplars are defined by Zagzebski to be “those persons 
whom we see, on close observation and with reflection, to be admirable in all or most of their 
acquired traits.”112 For example, Jesus Christ, Guatama Buddha, Martin Luther King, Socrates, and 
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many others. However, I will also be focusing on moral exemplars in a weak sense, meaning that 
they only need to be admirable in the relevant traits to a given moral topic, rather than exemplary in 
all or most moral matters. In short, a moral exemplar is a moral expert with evident good character 
in at least some relevant moral areas. 
Zagzebski argues that the way we can identify moral exemplars is through feelings of 
admiration.113 By admiration, I mean the emotion that comes from “witnessing acts of virtue or 
moral beauty.”114 Jonathan Haidt terms my conception of admiration as the “other-praising 
emotion” of “elevation.”115 This terminology was inspired by Thomas Jefferson who describes how 
moral exemplars in fictional books can “elevate” a reader’s sentiments and “dilate [the reader’s] 
breast.”116 Jefferson describes this phenomenon as follows:117 
When any act of charity or of gratitude, for instance, is presented either to our sight or 
imagination, we are deeply impressed with its beauty and feel a strong desire in ourselves of 
doing charitable and grateful acts also. On the contrary when we see or read of any atrocious 
deed, we are disgusted with its deformity and conceive an abhorrence of vice.118 
 
Haidt claims that this feeling of admiration, or in his words, “elevation,” is what one feels toward 
moral exemplars.119 Zagzebski summarizes the main components of Haidt’s research on the feeling 
of admiration as follows:    
a. It is elicited by acts of charity, gratitude, fidelity, generosity, or any other strong display 
of virtue.  
b. It leads to distinctive physical feelings, including the feeling of dilation or opening in the 
chest, combined with the feeling that one had been uplifted or “elevated.” 
c. It gives rise to a specific motivation of action tendency: emulation, or the desire to 
perform the same kind of acts oneself.120 
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This research supports Zagzebski’s assertion that agents can identify moral exemplars through feelings 
of admiration.121    
However, Zagzebski maintains that the feeling of admiration does not entail a judgment that 
the object of admiration is in fact admirable.122 The distinction I am making between feeling and 
judgment is that a judgment is something like a feeling or intuition in which one has confidence. 
With admiration one is able to “withhold judgment” until they are able to “reflect or investigate the 
admired object further.”123 Zagzebski continues: 
Admiration need not include the judgment that the object of our admiration is admirable, 
but if we trust our emotion, we will be prepared to make that judgment. We tend not to 
make the judgment if we are skeptical of our emotional state, or if we wish to withhold 
judgment until we have been able to reflect or investigate the admired object further.124 
 
In other words, initially, the morally disoriented agent feels that the moral exemplar is admirable, 
and then over time the agent can become more confident about that intuition. This process is 
helpful in the case of the morally disoriented agent who does not feel as though they can rely on 
their own moral judgment. Instead, they can rely on their intuitions in order to find an exemplar, 
and then wait to see if the emotion of admiration “survives reflection over time.”125 Then, 
eventually, the morally disoriented agent can come to trust their own intuition and make the 
judgment that the person is a worthy moral exemplar.126  
One might wonder: Why not use this same process for making other moral judgments, 
besides judgments of moral exemplars? However, it is far more plausible that a morally disoriented 
person could identify a moral exemplar using feelings of admiration rather than a correct moral 
belief or belief system. According to Zagzebski,  
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We are often more certain of the identities of exemplars than we are of any conceptual 
foundation. For instance, I think we are more certain about Confucius, Jesus, and Socrates 
are admirable than we are of claims about the good of pleasure, or what human flourishing 
is, or the good of doing one’s duty, or any of the other claims that are used to ground a 
moral theory. In fact, I think that we are more certain that they are admirable than we are of 
what is admirable about them.127  
 
Zagzebski also states that while a belief system or moral theory might provide a “city map” for the 
morally disoriented agent, they would still need some kind of sign that can help orient them.128 For 
example, a “You are here” sign or a landmark.129 Zagzebski argues that moral exemplars can serve as 
those signs. She explains: “Just as a city map is useless unless we can identify something on the map 
by reference to something in our environment, a moral theory is useless unless we can find a place 
where the theory connects to a part of the moral domain we can identify independent of the 
theory.”130 Therefore, while the process of relying on one’s intuitions first and then forming a moral 
judgment over time works well for identifying moral exemplars, it is not as useful for coming to 
other moral judgments.  
However, in order for the morally disoriented to feel confident in trusting a moral exemplar 
over time, moral exemplars will need to be observed closely. It is difficult to gather all of this 
evidence with people we know only casually or formally. Accordingly, I shall argue that the people 
we can most reliably identify as moral exemplars are those closest to us (if any of them are moral 
exemplars), since it is easier to observe potential markers of excellence in the people we know 
intimately. 
 
2. Why the Morally Disoriented Should Defer to Friends 
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Aristotle writes that “in poverty and other misfortunes of life,” true friends are “the only 
refuge.”131 I argue that true friends are also a refuge in times of moral disorientation. Friends of 
virtue are defined by Aristotle to be those who are “anxious to do well by each other” and are 
concerned with promoting each other’s wellbeing.132 Such friends might include family, romantic 
partners, mentors or others, so long as they genuinely care about you. These are the friends who 
help and challenge you to become a better person. As Aristotle writes, “a certain training in virtue 
arises also from the company of the good...”133 I will be arguing that the moral exemplars most easily 
identifiable for the morally disoriented are the ones who are also friends of virtue. 
The diagram below illustrates the recommendation that I am offering to the morally 
disoriented agent. In short, the morally disorientated agent should defer to moral experts that they 
can more easily identify (moral exemplars) and can be in close trusting proximity with (friends).  
  
 
Both Harbin and Brison provide direct support for the orienting capacity of friendships. In 
Harbin’s acknowledgements, she describes her partner as being her “closest and most truth-telling 
interlocutor” and states that together their life is “orienting.”134 Though Harbin maintains that “the 
main function” of the people closest to us “is not to interact with us in ways that reorient us…,” it 
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seems that she has experienced the orienting power of friendship in her own life.135 As I argued 
previously, by deferring to others, an agent is able to obtain valuable moral testimony of who one is 
or who one can be, which is an essential moral starting point for the morally disoriented person who 
wants to be good. Brison supports this claim by noting that her disorienting experience inspired her 
view that the self is “fundamentally relational” and is capable of “being remade in connection with 
others.”136 In short, friends have the ability to help reorient the morally disoriented.  
Moreover, friendships also offer relevant evidence of trustworthiness. True friendship takes 
time. As Aristotle says, “a wish for friendship may arise quickly, but friendship does not,” and in fact 
“requires time and familiarity.”137 Thus friendships provide relevant evidence for a testifier’s 
reliability because they offer a sustained period of intimate observation. And, returning to 
Zagzebski’s argument for identifying a moral exemplar, the only way a morally disoriented person 
can come to trust their emotion that someone is admirable, is if that emotion can withstand 
observation and critical reflection over time.138 For example, Karen Jones’ offers some insight into 
potential markers for trustworthy moral exemplars: 
We shall want to have good evidence about the person’s character, about possible hidden 
agendas, and about whether she has the sort of experiences that contribute to the kind of 
competence we are counting on her to have. We would also want to know that our witnesses 
have appropriate epistemic self-assessment and are not given to asserting with confidence 
claims that they are in a position to assert only tentatively if at all.139  
 
Besides the common intuition that one can trust the people closest to them, it seems that given any 
set of markers for a reliable testifier, an agent is more likely to be able to identify those markers if 
the testifier is someone they know personally.140  
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This evidence of reliability is especially important to the morally disoriented agent, since they 
can be vulnerable to moral hustlers with hidden agendas. For example, those who are morally 
disoriented are sometimes preyed on by religious organizations. As a former proselytizing 
missionary, my mission president advised us to “look for people who have just experienced a death 
in the family or have just had a new child or who have experienced some other life changing event.” 
That is when I began to suspect that my mission was really about trying to find vulnerable people to 
baptize in order to fill a quota, rather than simply sharing “the Good News.” The problem with 
relying on people that an agent does not know personally and intimately is that it is going to be more 
difficult for the morally disoriented to observe defeaters such as hidden agendas. Therefore, 
friendship provides the time and proximity to gain confidence in one’s intuitions about admirability 
and moral excellence.  
Furthermore, Paddy McShane points out that with the people closest to us we can come to 
“fine-tune” on which topics we depend on their moral testimony for. If we find them to be “locally 
unreliable in some way,” our dependence can exclude certain moral topics or circumstances of their 
unreliability.141 For example, if an agent knows that one of their friends can be petty, they may want 
to avoid asking that friend about how they should respond to their frustration with another person. 
Or if an agent knows their friend is particularly grumpy in the morning before they have had their 
coffee, the agent might avoid asking their friend what they think about people in that particular 
circumstance.  
 In addition to having more opportunities for verifying trustworthiness, relationships provide 
incentives to be trustworthy. Unlike books or radio hosts or preachers, the intimate speaker is more 
likely to specifically address the hearer. For example, a friend might preface this invitation with 
 
141 McShane, Paddy J. “The non-remedial value of dependence on moral testimony.” Philos Stud, 2018. (p.645). 
38 
something like, “trust me…” or “believe me…”142 McShane explains that for the testifier, “issuing 
such an invitation brings with it certain responsibilities; for example, a testifier should have grounds 
for thinking that he can live up to your trust, should you accept his invitation.”143 In other words, the 
fact that testimony was personally invited by someone who wants you to depend on them provides a 
reason for the testifier to speak reliably.  
 Moreover, by accepting a friend’s testimony, we are conveying trust in them, which is 
“constitutive of the ideal of friendship.”144 This is because in the case of moral testimony, by 
choosing to depend on a friend, the agent makes themselves vulnerable to them and therefore 
expresses trust.145 Accordingly, in friendships, trusting the people closest to you is an ideal which can 
sometimes compete with the ideal of doing what’s right:   
We often find ourselves in situations in which the value of trusting pulls against other moral 
considerations. Trust does not always win out in these situations, but it often does. Because 
trust is so important to our relationships, and our relationships are themselves so important, 
trust even wins out when the degree of risk is quite high, and the consequences of our trust 
being let down is morally weighty.146  
 
However, it seems that taking these morally weighty risks are unjustified outside of these types of 
relationships. For example, it seems that we would be more sympathetic toward an agent who 
commits wrongdoing because they relied on their close friends or family for moral testimony, rather 
than a person who commits wrongdoing after relying on the moral testimony of a radio host. In the 
case of deferring to moral exemplars whom the agent does not intimately know, trust should not be 
a strongly competing ideal since there is no personal relationship. As a result, even if the morally 
disoriented person’s initial intuition is wrong regarding whether or not their friend is a moral 
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exemplar, the risk of wrongdoing is more justified than in the case of deferring to non-intimate 
moral exemplars. 
 Given these reasons, I argue that the morally disoriented agent should first look for friends 
of virtue who provoke feelings of admiration. Next, they should see if upon close observation and 
critical reflection the friend continues to appear trustworthy. Then, the morally disoriented agent 
should begin relying on their friend’s moral testimony, and act on the trust that is essential to the 
ideal of friendship. Lastly, time and experience may further strengthen or weaken the morally 
disoriented agent’s estimation of the person as a moral exemplar. Accordingly, this process can lead 
the morally disorientated agent on the path to orientation. 
 
3. Objections  
Unfortunately, dependence within friendships tends to have a bad reputation.147 For 
example, consider dysfunctional labeling such as “co-dependent” or “emotionally dependent.”148 
However, McShane argues that instances of “co-dependence” are mostly seen as bad because they 
“prop up unhealthy or immoral behaviors (e.g. addiction, abuse, etc.)” whereas in the case of moral 
deference, the friends are relying on each other for “good things.”149 She then continues on to say, 
“to adopt the aim of becoming entirely independent of a friend’s good will for good things seems at 
odds with being in a friendship, especially an ideal one.”150 In this case, it would be strange for 
friends not to depend on each other for the “good of moral knowledge.”151 McShane explains that 
“we often see acts of dependence as important milestones in friendship.”152 For example, when a 
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friend asks a person to watch their pet for them, or when a person is invited to move in with their 
romantic partner. Sometimes we depend on friends even when we don’t have to because it seems to 
be an important part of the intimacy of the relationship.153 Therefore, contrary to being 
dysfunctional, depending on one another’s testimony is essential to the “flourishing of our intimate 
relationships.”154  
 However, perhaps the worry is that, given the morally disoriented agent’s exacerbated state 
of uncertainty, they may come to depend too heavily on their friends. In other words, there can be a 
lack of reciprocity or an overdependence on others for moral testimony. McShane concedes that 
“one-sided dependence can signal a departure from the ideal friendship” and that “for dependence 
to play a role in constituting the ideal friendship, it must be reciprocal.”155 For example, returning to 
Fleabag, her overdependence is evident as she essentially pleads: “tell me how to live my life.”156 
And while this high degree of dependence may be acceptable for short periods of time, moral 
disorientation is temporally extended.  
Nevertheless, McShane argues:  
To say that dependence on friends is valuable is not to say that it should be pursued to the 
extreme. It is also not to say that it is the only thing that is of value; indeed, the value of 
dependence should be situated and pursued alongside other, sometimes competing, values 
(e.g., the value of independence).157 
 
Luckily, according to Harbin, the morally disoriented are benefited with capacities to function 
without resoluteness, where “by acting irresolutely, one can tentatively pursue multiple goals that are 
in tension with one another.”158 Therefore, the morally disoriented should pursue the value of 
dependence in cases of moral topics they are disoriented in and pursue independence in others. This 
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seems possible, considering it is not likely that an agent would be disoriented on every given moral 
topic.  
Moreover, it seems unlikely that there would be a significant lack of reciprocity in regard to 
valuable moral testimony on the part of the morally disoriented agent. Seeing as moral disorientation 
has potential epistemic benefits, the morally disoriented agent would have certain epistemic expertise 
from their experiences. For example, Julia Driver writes:  
Someone who has actually experienced a tragedy is frequently taken to be a greater authority 
on that tragedy than someone who has not. The idea is that imagination, empathy, and 
sympathy take you only so far. One can’t know what it is like to lose a loved one, it is 
claimed, unless one has lost a loved one.159  
 
While this may not be a propositional type of knowledge, Driver argues that “the intuition carries 
over” to moral testimony. For example, returning to Lewis’ account of grief, it seems that his 
assertion has greater authority than others who have not experienced the death of a loved one. In 
fact, he even describes his frustrations with those who try to assert something they don’t truly 
understand. 
It is hard to have patience with people who say, ‘There is no death’ or ‘Death doesn’t 
matter.’ There is death. And whatever is matters. And whatever happens has consequences, 
and it and they are irrevocable and irreversible. You might as well say that birth doesn’t 
matter. I look up at the night sky. Is there anything more certain than in those vast times and 
spaces, if I were allowed to search them, I should nowhere find her face, her voice, her 
touch? She died. She is dead. Is the word so difficult to learn?160 
 
McShane states that the “reciprocity of dependence should not merely be understood quantitatively, 
but also qualitatively.”161 It seems that in cases of moral disorientation, the agent may have a better-
quality moral testimony when it comes to topics within the realm of their experiences. Furthermore, 
the morally disoriented person may also invite their friend to learn how to attend to them in ways 
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that strengthen their friend’s moral character; for example, they might advise them to have more 
empathy or patience.  
Another potential concern is what a disoriented agent should do when their disorientation is 
about their friends. Perhaps they experienced some kind of betrayal or abandonment, or there is 
reason to believe a friend is no longer reliable. Certainly, this seems that it would set a morally 
disoriented agent up for a disadvantage. In the case of disorientation about only some of their 
friends, the agent can simply rely on the ones who seem most reliable. Though, unfortunately, in the 
case that there is moral disorientation about all of their friends (or all of their friends who are also 
friends of virtue), there is no helpful answer beyond the recommendation to find new friends. 
However, there should be some hope that admiration should lead one, eventually, to those whose 
“moral beauty” attracts them. Thus, despite the significant setback, the morally disoriented person 
still has hope in finding new friends of virtue that can offer orienting insight and perspective. While 
it is difficult to find a true friend, as I have argued previously, going it alone is not an option. So, 
now that the morally disoriented agent knows they can defer to moral exemplars who are friends, if 














Moral disorientation challenges certain assumptions of how self-reliant people can be. For a 
morally disoriented person who has experienced a loss of moral beliefs, disorientation cuts through 
the illusion “that a person can always turn within, regardless of external and physical hardships, to 
find a reliable bedrock of clarity and resolve.”162 In other words, moral disorientation forces us to 
recognize our interdependence with others when it comes to making moral judgments.163 So, how 
should the morally disoriented person who wants to be good reorient themselves? They should defer 
to moral exemplars about morality, including about their own moral character. Moral exemplars are 
more easily and reliably identifiable when they are friends. Relying on others is also constitutive of 
the ideal friendship of virtue. In the case of the morally disoriented, friendships are essential in 
navigating moral life. As Raphael Bob-Waksberg once wrote, “in this terrifying world, all we have 








162 Springer, Elise. “Disorientation and Moral Life.” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 29 Nov. 2018, 
ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/disorientation-and-moral-life. (emphasis in original).  
163 Harbin, Ami. Disorientation and Moral Life. Oxford University Press, 2016 (p.59). 




Algoe SB, Haidt J. Witnessing excellence in action: the 'other-praising' emotions of elevation, 
xxxxxgratitude, and admiration. J Posit Psychol. 2009;4(2):(p.105-127).  A portion also quoted in 
xxxxxZagzebski (2017).   
 
Ariew, Roger, and Eric Watkins. Modern Philosophy: an Anthology of Primary Sources. Hackett Publishing 
xxxxxCompany, Inc., 2019. p. 64. 
Aristotle, Translated by David Ross. The Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford University Press. 2009.  
 Bob-Waksberg, R. (n.d.). Bojack Horseman: Season 1, Episode 11 "Downer Ending," & Season 3, 
xxxxxEpisode 4 “Fish Out of Water.” [Cartoon]. 
Brison, Susan J. Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self. Princeton University Press, 
xxxxx2002. 
Driver, Julia. “Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise.” Philosophical Studies, 
xxxxxApr. 2006, Vol. 128, No. 3, pp 619-644.  
 
Enoch, David. “A Defence of Moral Deference.” The Journal of Philosophy, May 2014, Vol. 111. 
xxxxxNo. 5. pp. 229-258. 
Harbin, Ami. Disorientation and Moral Life. Oxford University Press, 2016. 
Hills, A. (2009). Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology. Ethics, 120(1), 94-127. xxxx 
Hills, A. “Moral Testimony.” Philosophy Compass. 2013.  
 
Jefferson T. Letter to Robert Skipwith. In: Peterson MD, editor. The portable Thomas Jefferson. New 
xxxxxYork: Penguin; 1975. (p. 349). (Original work published 1771). 
 
Jones, Karen. “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge.” The Journal of Philosophy. Feb. 1999, Vol.  
xxxxx96, No. 2, pp 55-78. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment? 
xxxxxweb.cn.edu/kwheeler/documents/What_is_Enlightenment.pdf.   
 
Lewis, C.S. A Grief Observed. HarperCollins, 1994. 
 
McShane, Paddy J. “The non-remedial value of dependence on moral testimony.” Philos Stud, 2018.  
 
Sartre, Jean-Paul/ “Existentialism and Humanism.” Basic Writings. Ed. Stephen Priest. London, 
xxxxxRoutledge. 2001. 
 
Satrapi, Marjane. Persepolis. L'Association, 2017.  
45 
xxxxxScholinski, Daphne, and Jane Meredith Adams. Last Time I Wore a Dress. Riverhead, 1998. 
 
Sliwa, Paulina. “In Defense of Moral Testimony.” Philosophical Studies, vol. 158, no. 2, 2012, 
xxxxxpp. 175–195. 
Springer, Elise.“Disorientation and Moral Life.” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 29 Nov. 2018, 
xxxxxndpr.nd.edu/reviews/disorientation-and-moral-life. 
 
Waller-Bridge, Phoebe. Fleabag: Season 1, Episode 1 & Season 2, Episode 4.  
xxxxxZagzebski, Linda Trinkaus. Exemplarist Moral Theory. Oxford University Press, 2017. 
“Zorp the Surveyor.” Parks and Recreation Wiki, 
xxxxxparksandrecreation.fandom.com/wiki/Zorp_the_Surveyor.  
 
 
 
 
